Abstract -We describe an a t t a c k on the cryptosystem Polly Cracker for which it is not necessary to know a superset of the monomials used during encryption. The attack is demonstrated w i t h Koblitz's ''graph perfect code instance" of Polly Cracker.
I. INTRODUCTION
In [ l , 21 Fellows and Koblitz propose the cryptosystem Polly Cracker. We describe an attack on individual ciphertexts that can apply even if the encryption procedure is designed to resist a linear algebra attack. The attack is illustrated with the "graph perfect code instance" of Polly Cracker [2, Ch. 5, $71.
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. . ,xn]. Then Polly Cracker can be described as follows (for more details see [l, 21) We assume that finding a common zero of q1, . . . , qr is infeasible and that some monomials (monic terms) used during the encryption are "hidden" to preclude linear algebra attacks (cf.
P , Ch. 5 , $61).
EXPLOITING T H E STRUCTURE O F T H E CIPHERTEXT
Let IFps [ x , x-' 
Next, let c = ct+Ci=l hiqi be some ciphertext, and assume that for some i E { 1, . . . , r ) there are terms yPi xPi , yui xui in qi such that there is a 6i := y P i x P i / y U i x u i
, and a term yqi xqi in hi with xqi .xPi and xoi .xu; not occurring among the monomials of c -yqi xqi . q j .
The first condition means that qi possesses a "characteristic term difference'' &, and the second one guarantees that the lexicographic order on
.
u i x u i ) E A(c). ( 1 )
For this conclusion it is irrelevant whether xoi itself occurs in c. Now, if for some 1 5 i 5 r an attacker can find terms t 1 , t z in c with xpi 1 tl and tl/tz being equal to the "characteristic difference" 6i, then he can make the assumption that both of the above conditions hold, and with ( 1 ) he can identify a
potential term t h of hi as t h := tl/(YPixPi) = t z / ( y u i x u i ) .
The attacker cannot be sure whether t h is really a term of hi, but c' := C -t h 'qi and c encrypt the same plaintext, and if c' involves less terms than c, then this can be taken as evidence for the correctness of the guess. In particular, if c' E Fp, then the encrypted plaintext has been recovered successfully.
To derive a private key-public key pair, a special kind of graph with n M 500 vertices is used. Two further values d M 21og, n z 18 and do M d / 3 are used to control the encryption procedure (see [2, Ch. 5 , 571 for details).
Experimentally, these values turn out to be rather cumbersome: already for n = 128 (d = 14, do = 5 ) a single plaintext bit a E F 2 yields a ciphertext consisting of some 60,000 terms! Here we restrict to cases with 100 5 n 5 200 where encrypting one bit yields "only" several thousand terms. To a given ciphertext c E S [ x ] we can apply the following variant of the above attack where A is not computed explicitly (for the notation see [ 2 , Ch. 5, 53, $71): Iv. KOBLITZ'S GRAPH P E R F E C T CODE INSTANCE 1. Pick a public qi of the form 1 -CuEN[vl xu randomly.
2.
For each term t , in c and t, in qi with t41tc check if subtracting R(qi . $) from c reduces the number of terms. 3. If yes, iterate the attack with the "simplified" ciphertext from step 2 until we end up with a constant c. 4. If no, go to step 2, and eventually skip back to step 1. Already this simple procedure-without combining it with a linear algebra attack-works rather well when the plaintext bit is 0. E.g., for n = 128 ( d = 14, do = 5 ) in 94 out of 100 encryptions of a = 0 we could reveal a successfully. If the attack fails, there is a high probability that the encrypted plaintext bit is 1, i. e., we have quite a good chance to recover the plaintext bit successfully without needing the secret key.
V. CONCLUSION
An attack on Polly Cracker for dealing with "hidden" monomials has been described; in particular the attack can be used to enhance the feasibility of a linear algebra based attack. The experimental results with Koblitz's graph perfect code instance give strong evidence that this instance of Polly Cracker does not offer acceptable cryptographic security.
